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ADVOCATING “DIGNITY” AND “RETURN” FOR
LEBANON’S PALESTINIANS:
IMAGINING A DIASPORIC PROJECT
Sergio Bianchi*
The 2010 reform of the legal regime regulating Palestinians’ access to the labour
market in Lebanon ignited a heated debate among Lebanese, Palestinians, and
international political actors. This article analyses the advocacy initiatives preceding
the reform to answer the following question: what signifiers of Palestinian-ness have
Palestinian political entrepreneurs mobilised? In a nutshell, it shows how a group of
non-governmental organizations working with Palestinian refugees in Lebanon
re-shaped the references to “Return” and “Dignity” in order to create an intellectual
environment favourable to their demands for legal reform. However, these two
signifiers not only concern the issue of the work-related rights of Lebanon’s
Palestinians, but they also envisage a specific form of emplacement of the
Palestinian community in that country. From this perspective, they are the constitu-
tive elements of a “diasporic project” of emplacement in which Palestinians
collectively exist in an in-between (imagined) space situated somewhere between
their host society and their homeland.
Keywords: Palestinian refugees, diaspora, advocacy, Lebanon
1. Introduction
On 17 August 2010, the Lebanese Parliament approved some modifications of
the legal regime regulating foreigners’ access to the labour market explicitly
designed for Lebanon’s Palestinians. This vote marked an important evolution
in Lebanese-Palestinian coexistence by crystallising two narratives of this
coexistence into a formal law-like compromise – which respectively opposed
and supported the abovementioned reform. More precisely, as I will demonstrate
in the following pages, these narratives not only constitute the main arguments
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used by Lebanese and Palestinian collective actors to support or oppose the
proposals of legal reform, but they also shape the intellectual boundaries of
this debate. Given their crucial role in shaping the subsequent legal and political
discussion, this article describes and analyses these narratives focusing on two of
their constitutive elements in particular. Any narrative on the Palestinian pres-
ence in Lebanon is based on both (normative) visions of what the Palestinian
community is/should be and (normative) visions of how it is/should be
connected to the Lebanese host society. Otherwise said, any narrative is built
upon different sets of signifiers of the Palestinian displacement from the ancestral
homeland and of the Palestinian emplacement in Lebanon. These signifiers are
the main symbolic elements put forward in the political imagination of the
Palestinian collective presence in Lebanon.
Since 1948, several signifiers have been elaborated and re-elaborated to
point to the Palestinian presence in Lebanon as a single, homogenous, bounded
group of individuals: exile, refugee-ness, armed struggle, criminality, political
Islam, and social exclusion, among others. By looking into the signifiers
produced and diffused by Palestinian collective actors during the debate that
preceded the parliamentary vote, I aim to explore one fundamental question:
how Lebanon’s Palestinians (or at least some of them) depict their permanence
on the Lebanese territory/in Lebanese society in the second decade of the 21st
century.
After introducing the historic evolution of the legal framework that regu-
lates Palestinians’ access to the formal labour market and the main actors
involved in the debate concerning its reform, I analyse the processes of symbolic
production activated by the Palestinian mobilisation in favour of reforming the
existing legal framework before August 2010 in the second section of the article.
In the third section, I explore the connections between the representations and
the symbols produced in favour of the reform of the legal framework, and the
representations and symbols used to oppose any reform. There, I exploit the
emplacement-displacement dichotomy1 to explore how the above-mentioned
representation and symbols can be conceived as elements of a “diasporic pro-
ject”2 used in the struggle over the meaning of the Palestinian presence in
Lebanon. In the conclusion, I attempt to problematise the in-between-ness of
this “diasporic project” by comparing the features of the struggle engaging
Lebanon’s Palestinian with other diasporic project-driven struggles as presented
in the theoretical literature.
1 This dichotomy was introduced in the study of displacement by Lisa Malkki in her seminal article about the
construction of the knowledge frameworks used to manage refugees cf. L. Malkki, “Refugees and Exile: From
‘Refugee Studies’ to the National Order of Things”, Annual Review of Anthropology, 24, 1995, 515–516.
2 Concerning the notion of “diasporic project”, I draw on Brubaker’s concluding remarks on the (inflated) use
of the concept of Diaspora. More precisely, I accept his suggestion to conceive Diaspora and (potentially)
diasporic narratives: “as a category of practice, project, claim and stance, rather than as a bounded group. The
‘groupness’ of putative diasporas [. . .] is precisely what is at stake in [political, social and cultural] struggles.”
R. Brubaker, “The ‘diaspora’ diaspora”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28(1), 2005, 13.
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The corpus of data upon which this article is based was collected during 15
months of ethnographic fieldwork involving semi-directed interviews, partici-
pant observation sessions, and documental research. During this period, my role
evolved in the eyes of my informants. Chronologically, I have been an academic
researcher, a foreign volunteer working in a non-governmental organization
(NGO) (namely Association Najdeh), a conference speaker, and an acquaint-
ance. Of course, the quality and quantity of my inquiry was influenced by each
of these positions in the field, which opened certain doors to me and closed
others. A second limitation stemmed from the selection process of the most
pertinent events among the imaginative, political, and legal phenomena that
are the subjects of this article. For the sake of clarity, I limit myself to the
description and analysis of the symbolic dimensions relative to the legal
reform. Other dimensions, such as the fragmentation of Palestinian political
parties and NGOs leading to competing mobilisations, have not been discussed
in this article. However, these dimensions have been exhaustively explored
elsewhere.3
2. Palestinian legal status and work-related rights in Lebanon
(1959–2005)
2.1. Legal instruments shaping Palestinians’ status
The complex history of Palestinian displacement inside Lebanon and the legal
measures taken to regulate it is beyond the scope of this study.4 However, it is
useful to mention the constitutive elements of the regime regulating Palestinians’
access to the Lebanese labour market to fully understand the framework of the
debates on the reform. While in 1948 a ministerial decree established a com-
mittee in charge of registering the refugees, known as the Central Committee for
Palestine refugees’ affairs, Palestinians were initially considered as foreigners – i.e.
any individual not fulfilling the criteria set by Lebanese law. Not until 1959 did
the Lebanese Government create a specific directorate for Palestinian affairs
inside the Ministry of the Interior and adopt specific procedures targeting
Palestinian refugees, such as Decision No. 319.5 Under this decision, individuals
registered with the directorate were considered stateless, free to move inside
Lebanon and exempt from the obligation of obtaining a residency visa.
3 The most insightful studies about these dimensions have been authored by Sari Hanafi. See S. Hanafi,
“Al-h [uqwq al-madanya li-l-filasbynyyn fy lubnan: al-h[amla wa al-h[amla al-mad [ada”, majala al-dirasat al-fi-
lasbynya, 21(83), 2010, 30–43. S. Hanafi, “Al-Huquq al-madaniyya wa al-ijtimaiyya-iqtisaddiya al-filastiniyya
fi lubnan; al-hamla wa al-hamla al-maddada”, majala al-dirasat al-filasbınıa (trad: Journal of Palestinian
Studies), 21(83), 2010.
4 What is more, accurate accounts of this displacement have already been written. See M. Kamel-Doraı¨,
Les re´fugie´s palestiniens du Liban. Une ge´ographie de l’exile, Paris, CNRS e´ditions, 2006; J. Sfeir, L’exil
palestinien au Liban : le temps des origines (1947-1952), Paris/Beyrouth/Karthala, IFPO, 2008.
5 This Interior Minister’s decision created an ad-hoc category – which included registered refugees – not
submitted to the constraints listed in the law of 10 Jul. 1962 about the circulation and residency of foreigners
in Lebanon.
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In the 1960s, these freedoms were countered by the constraints imposed by
the Lebanese authorities on foreigners’ economic activities, which indirectly
affected the Palestinians. In 1964, Decree No. 17561 obligated all foreigners
to obtain work permits from the Ministry of Labour, with no exception for
refugees. Thus, Palestinians were required to obtain a yearly work permit. The
same act imposed affiliation with a professional association as a prerequisite to
practice a number of professions. Since the rules of most Lebanese professional
associations6 require an applicant for membership to hold Lebanese citizenship,7
Palestinians were prevented from accessing liberal professions. Finally, because of
the reciprocity clause included in the 1963 Social Security Law, Palestinians were
also excluded from all kinds of work leave (maternity, illness, work accident,
occupational) and end-of-service compensation payments.8
Even though these restrictions were de facto suspended between 1969 and
19829 because of the entry into force of the Cairo Agreement,10 the situation
drastically worsened after the 1982 Israeli invasion. Following this, a number of
reforms were passed to further restrain Palestinian access to the Lebanese labour
market: Ministerial Decision No. 1/289, issued in 1982, prevented non-
Lebanese from being hired in a list of clerical and manual positions; in 1987
the Lebanese Parliament voted for the abolition of the Cairo Agreement; in 1990
the Constitutional amendments approved in Ta’if banned any form of natura-
lisation (tawbyn);11 finally, in 1995, the Labour Minister’s Decision 621/1 added
50 professions to the list of jobs forbidden to non-Lebanese.
In 2005, this trend was partially reversed by the Labour Minister’s
Memorandum No. 67/1, which reduced the number of clerical and manual
6 Among others, lawyers’, doctors’, and engineers’ associations.
7 Alternatively, affiliation may be granted to nationals of States that grant the same access rights to Lebanese
under a legal dispositive known as the reciprocity clause.
8 For a complete overview concerning these issues, see cf. S. El-Natour & D. Yassine, The Legal Status of the
Palestine Refugees in Lebanon and the Demands of Adjustment, Beirut, Human Development Center (HDC)
and Canadian International Development Research Center (IRDC), 2007, 110.
9 In terms of labour demand, the arrival of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon created a
quasi-public sector hiring of almost exclusively Palestinian refugees, as had already occurred in the United
Nation Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Under the banner of the
armed resistance (muqawama) leading to return to Palestine (}awda) and the fulfilment of the Palestinian
cause (qad [ya filasbynya), both political parties’ military wings and the non-military organizations depending
on the PLO hired massively among Palestinians. R. Sayigh, “Palestinians in Lebanon: Harsh Present,
Uncertain Future”, Journal of Palestine Studies, 25(1), 1995; cf. Y. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search
for State : the Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997.
10 About the impact of the Cairo Agreement on the everyday Palestinian existence in Lebanon, see A. Knudsen,
“Widening the Protection Gap: the ‘Politics of Citizenship’ for Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon,
1948-2008”, Journal of Refugee Studies, 22(1), 2009, 55.
11 In explicitly refusing the naturalisation of Palestinians in the most important piece of law of the Lebanese
state, the leaders gathered in Ta’if justified their attitude by emphasising their support for Palestinians’ return
(‘awda) to their country. However, as correctly argued by Chaaban et al.: “The Lebanese position on return
to Palestine is sometimes used to justify discriminatory policies against the Palestinian refugees . . . .”
J. Chaaban & H. Ghattas & R.R. Habib & S. Hanafi & N. Sahyoun & N. Salti & K. Seyfert &
N. Naamani, Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, Beirut, AUB-UNRWA, 2010, avail-
able at http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2011012074253.pdf (last visited 9 Nov. 2012).
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jobs forbidden to Palestinians.12 At the same time, the Prime Minister created
the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee – a body in charge of dealing with
security-related and rights-related aspects of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon.
After the establishment of the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee
(LPDC), many other initiatives were undertaken at different levels to tackle
the issues of Palestinian rights in Lebanon – not the first time such efforts
had been undertaken. The unilateral abrogation of the Cairo Agreement resulted
in a legal gap concerning the protection and duties of Palestinians resident in
Lebanon. A first attempt to remedy this situation occurred in 1991 when
meetings took place between Lebanese representatives and Palestinian political
representatives,13 but without any practical results.14
2.2. Main collective actors supporting the enhancement of Palestinians’
right to employment
After 2005, several initiatives aimed at the enhancement of Palestinians’
rights were launched. Through these initiatives, the advocates of Palestinian
rights – namely the PLO, the UNRWA, Palestinian and foreign NGOs, and
some foreign (European) governments – engaged Lebanese decision-making
instances on three levels.
At the diplomatic level, the official Lebanese-Palestinian communication
channel was re-opened in 2006 thanks to a Lebanese decision to allow the
establishment of a PLO representation office in Beirut. The renewed diplomatic
relations entailed an increase in contact between the Palestinian Authority and
Lebanese Government officials, mostly at the ministerial level, with the former
asking for the recognition of basic rights for Lebanon’s Palestinians. Beyond that,
some international organizations became engaged in pressuring the Lebanese
Government through high-level confidential contacts.15
At the Lebanese level, advocacy initiatives focused more specifically on the
issue of the right to employment. One of these is the Follow-up Committee for
the Employment of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (FCEP) – created at the
end of 2006 through funding from the Swiss Agency for Development and
Cooperation in cooperation with the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and the UNRWA. This consultative body originally included representatives
from the Lebanese ministries concerned with Palestinians’ employment,16
12 J. Suleiman, Marginalised Community: The Case of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, Brighton, Development
Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty - University of Sussex, 30, 2006, available at:
http://www.migrationdrc.org/publications/research_reports/JaberEdited.pdf (last visited 13 Jul. 2013).
13 These individuals belonged to the PLO and to the Tah[aluf. The Fatah-led PLO controlled the refugee camps
in southern Lebanon, while the pro-Syrian factions grouped in the Tah[aluf (in English, the coalition) were in
charge of the security of the camps in Beirut, the Bekaa, and northern Lebanon.
14 J. Suleiman, “The Current Political, Organizational, and Security Situation in the Palestinian Refugee
Camps of Lebanon”, Journal of Palestine Studies, 29(1), 1999, 69.
15 Interview with a UN officer, Beirut, 10 Jun. 2010.
16 I.e. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Labour.
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representatives from Lebanese and Palestinian civil societies,17 a PLO represen-
tative, and a high-ranking UNRWA officer. The main purpose of this committee
is “to establish that the employment of Palestinian refugees and better working
conditions is a win-win scenario for both the Palestinians and the Lebanese”.18
At the “civil society” level – in addition to the committee including mem-
bers from both governmental and non-governmental institutions mentioned
above – a number of non-profit, non-governmental organizations engaged in
the provision of welfare services and advocacy on behalf of Lebanon’s
Palestinians started public campaigns specifically promoting Palestinians’ right
to employment. Most of the organizations engaged in these campaigns belong to
the group of associations labelled “Palestinian NGOs”.19 After 2005, these
NGOs, through advocacy campaigns, started to put pressure, individually (as
in the case of Palestinian Human Rights Organization (PHRO), Thabit, and
Shahyd) or collectively (as in the case of the Coalition for the Right to Work led
by Association Najdeh and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), or via the FCEP), on
the Lebanese authorities to reform the legal regime regulating Palestinians’ access
to the labour market. The majority of these campaigns were financed by ad-hoc
donations provided by foreign NGOs.20 Furthermore, these campaigns were
coupled with foreign NGOs’ pressure on European governments to lobby for
Palestinians’ rights through diplomatic channels.
All of these collective actors played a role in the 5 years that preceded the
3-month-long parliamentary debate that led to the vote on the reform of the
legal regime regulating Palestinians’ access to the labour market. Whereas most
of them contributed to the agenda setting process, it hardly seems possible to
17 Namely a retired Lebanese ambassador and the director of the Norwegian People’s Aid; NPA is a Norwegian
NGO. Its local branch has been very active inside Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon since 1982.
18 Quote from the “Home” section of the CEP website: CEP, “Committee for the Employment of the
Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon – Home”, available at: http://www.cep-lb.org/index.html (last visited 1
Jan. 2012).
19 This category, originally conceived by Jaber Suleiman, includes: “legally Lebanese NGOs, they are in reality
Palestinian associations. Although they nominally offer their services to the needy of both communities, their
work is concentrated in refugee camps and other Palestinian areas. Since Palestinians in Lebanon have no
right to form autonomous associations, they organize associations in which Lebanese citizens comprise the
general assembly and administrative committees. While the nominal leadership is comprised of Lebanese
citizens, however, the executive bodies of these NGOs usually include Palestinian activists. These NGOs,
while legally indistinguishable from Lebanese NGOs, are therefore de facto ‘Palestinian NGOs’.” J. Suleiman,
“Palestinians in Lebanon and the Role of Non-governmental Organizations”, Journal of Refugee Studies,
10(3), 1997, 401. The boundaries of this category need to be reassessed by integrating recent contributions
developed in the study of non-governmental organizations elsewhere in the Middle East, relief and service
provision no longer being the only activities undertaken by non-governmental actors. In the 1980s, a new
generation of organizations engaged in contentious actions aimed at the promotion of individual and col-
lective rights: S. Ben Ne´fissa, “Associations et ONG dans le monde arabe: vers la mise en place d’une
proble´matique”, in S. Ben Ne´fissa & S. Hanafi, Pouvoirs et associations dans le monde arabe, Paris, CNRS
Editions, 2002, 26–27. In Lebanon, this evolution occurred in the late 1990s and led to the emergence of
collective actors which – unlike the “original” Palestinian NGOs such as Najdeh, Beit Atfal Assumud, and
NPA, among others – focused only on the defence and promotion of Palestinians’ rights without getting
engaged in service provision. The PHRO, Ai}dun-Center for Refugee Rights, the Palestinian Organization
for the Right of Return-Thabit, and the Palestinian Association for Human Rights-Witness/Shahyd all belong
to this new generation of Palestinian NGOs.
20 More often than not, these foreign NGOs were the main donors to Palestinian NGOs.
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measure whether Palestinian NGOs have been more or less effective in obtaining
compliance from Lebanese authorities than the PLO, the UNRWA, and foreign
governments. However, this is not the point to prove. What I will illustrate in the
next section is that the Palestinian NGOs’ contribution shaped the boundaries of
the political debate by creating the corpus of knowledge used to represent the
Palestinian presence in Lebanon through certain themes strictly related to very
specific forms of emplacement and displacement.
Finally, it has to be pointed out that the processes of symbolic production
did not move forward linearly from the establishment of the LPDC to the 17
August 2012 vote. On the one hand, they sped up when diplomatic pressures
from some European governments and international organizations increased
Lebanese institutional sensitivity to the issue of Palestinian employment, espe-
cially in view of the negotiations for the Lebanon-EU association treaty. On the
other hand, a series of events distracted both the Lebanese authorities and
Palestinian NGOs. The 2006 war with Israel, the crises of national unity
governments, the destruction of the Nahr el-Bared refugee camp, and the
intra-Lebanese armed clashes diverted attention to other issues and hindered
the advancement of the Palestinians’ employment rights. However, between
2005 and 2010, Palestinian NGOs continued to produce and diffuse statistical
reports and other forms of knowledge concerning the employment conditions of
Lebanon’s Palestinians.
3. Reshaping the representation of the Palestinian community via
the debate over Palestinians’ right to work in Lebanon: the
NGO contribution
The following four quotes are very powerful examples of the two points I will
develop throughout this section: first, I argue that the Palestinian NGOs
produced converging representations of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon.
Second, I contend that these representations shaped the intellectual
boundaries of the imaginative processes underpinning collective actions and
experts’ debates concerning the reform initiatives mentioned in the previous
section.
3.1. The NGOs-produced, converging representations of the Palestinian
presence in Lebanon
The first quote opens a research paper authored by Jaber Suleiman, an inde-
pendent Palestinian researcher and the founder of Ai}dun:21
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are perhaps the most unfortunate and
destitute grouping of Palestinian refugees in any Arab host country. They
21 Ai}dun-Center for Refugee Rights is a Palestinian NGO established by former PLO activists in 1999. Its
activities mainly concern defence of and education about the right of return in Lebanon and Syria through
the production and diffusion of written material on the issue and participation in public events.
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are deprived of almost all civil rights and subjected to various forms of
marginalization – spatial, institutional and economic – and this marginal-
ization is often linked to exclusion and violence.22
The second one comes from Working Unprotected: Contributions of
Palestinian Refugees Residing in Camps & Some Gatherings To the Lebanese
Economy, a survey published by the Association Najdeh,23 and opens the section
“Current information on Contributions of Palestinian refugees to the Lebanese
economy”:
More than two generations of Palestinian refugees have since the Nakba
of 1948 been born and raised in Lebanon. They resided in the coun-
try, received education, worked, and spent their incomes and their
lives in Lebanon. [. . .] Such a dynamic necessitated a unique interaction
with the Lebanese economy similar but not identical with that of the
Lebanese with their own economy. The basic difference is that
Palestinians are refugees and there are legal barriers to their work and
other civil liberties that do not exist for other refugees. Such barriers con-
stitute an infringement on their human rights and are associated with a
substandard living.24
The third quote is included in the introductory section of Lebanese Labour
Laws . . . Palestinian Refugees Recent Situations. The Palestinians’ Contribution to
the Lebanon’s Economy published by the PHRO:25
From our point of view, any attempt to tackle the general situation of
the Palestinians who have been dispersed as refugees in many neighboring
Arab countries, will clearly show that Palestinians were affected and thus
reflected the social profile of their host countries [. . .] The most tough
events and circumstances were encountered by Palestinian refugees in
Lebanon; their repercussions are still shaping the refugees’ overall situation
[. . .]26
22 J. Suleiman, Marginalised Community: The Case of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, Development Research
Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty, University of Sussex, 30.
23 Association Najdeh activities started in 1976 after the destruction of Tal el-Zaatar camp. Its founders and
leaders are close to the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and were originally engaged
in providing welfare services to Tal el-Zaatar widows and orphans. Besides service provision in all Lebanese
camps, this NGO started its advocacy activities – focusing on the right to employment, domestic violence,
and the right of return – in the first half of the 2000s. Its main funders are a few (formerly faith-based)
European NGOs.
24 A. al-Khalidi, Working Unprotected. Contributions of Palestinian Refugees Residing in Camps & Some Gatherings
To the Lebanese Economy Beirut, Association Najdeh, 138, 2009, available at: http://www.association-najdeh.
org/pdf/Presenting%20the%20result%20of%20Palestinian%20refugees/Working%20Unprotected.pdf (last
visited 9 Nov. 2012).
25 PHRO was established in 1997 and aims to protect and promote the human rights of Lebanon’s Palestinians.
It belongs to the second wave of Palestinian NGOs and works mainly via advocacy initiatives funded by
Northern European governmental and non-governmental partners.
26 PHRO, Lebanese Labor Laws . . . Palestinian Refugees Recent Situations. The Palestinians’ Contribution to
the Lebanon’s Economy, Beirut, Palestinian Human Rights Organization-PHRO, 2009, 6, available
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The final quote opens the “Background” section of a report published by
the Follow-up Committee for the Employment of the Palestinians (FCEP)27
under the title Mapping Palestinian Refugee Employment 2007:
There are currently around 406,324 registered Palestine refugees in
Lebanon with UNRWA, [. . .] Around 200,000 refugees live in twelve of-
ficial camps in addition to scattered gatherings in South Lebanon. Official
restrictions imposed on the employment of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon
have always been an obstacle preventing them from participating normally
in the Lebanese labour market. These restrictions, against a background of
high unemployment rates currently prevailing in Lebanon aggravated by
political instability and conflicts has led to a further deterioration of the
employment situation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and thus worsen-
ing their living conditions.28
These four quotations present three similarities: first, they usually initiate a
section or a paragraph defining the main characteristics of the Palestinian com-
munity in Lebanon. Otherwise said, they are meant to provide the reader with
the essential characteristics of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. What is more,
they are all originally drafted in English. Whereas Suleiman’s paper, the Najdeh
survey, and the PHRO report were only drafted in English, the FCEP text exists
in both English and Arabic. Therefore, it seems safe to assume that the first three
documents target mainly an English-speaking audience that is unaware or poorly
informed about the Palestinian refugees’ situation in Lebanon – such as freshly-
posted international organizations officers, western diplomats, and foreign NGO
staff. The FCEP text, as the majority of the texts available in Arabic and English,
targets Lebanese decision- and opinion-makers, such as members of Parliament,
party leaders, journalists, and militant intellectuals,29 in addition to the groups
of professionals mentioned beforehand.
Second, all of the quotes posit the same essential characteristics of the
Palestinian presence in Lebanon: the refugee-ness of Palestinians and the depriv-
ation of their rights leading to poor living conditions and marginalisation/ex-
clusion. These characteristics depict the Palestinian collective existence through
two signifiers: one about the displacement from Palestine and the other about
the emplacement in Lebanon. Concerning displacement, the reference to refu-
gee-ness highlights the connection between Lebanon’s Palestinians and their lost
homeland on the one hand and with the other Palestinian communities on the
other. The reference to the uniqueness of the Palestinian nation is further
at: http://www.palhumanrights.org/rtw%20campaign/Right-to-work/Labor%20Study-English.pdf (last vis-
ited 9 Nov. 2012).
27 In 2009, Committee members decided to eliminate “Follow-up” and renamed this informal body
Committee for the Employment of the Palestinians (CEP). For more information about its establishment
and composition, see footnote 13 above.
28 FCEP, Mapping Palestinian Refugee employment 2007, Beirut, UNRWA-FCEP, 22, 2007, available at: http://
fcep-lb.org/pdf/Mapping_palestinian_workshop_2007.pdf (last visited 8 Nov. 2012).
29 The targeted audience can be inferred from the organization’s official objective, see above footnote 13.
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strengthened by comparing Lebanon’s Palestinians with Palestinians elsewhere.30
This being said, Lebanon’s Palestinians and the other Palestinian refugees are not
entirely alike. The distinction is brought forward in the second unity-signifying
theme of the quotes: the deprivation of basic human rights leading to “substand-
ard” living conditions. The reference to a mix of discriminatory legal and
economic situations represents a relatively new element in the history of the
signifiers of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. Even though poor living con-
ditions and refugee camps have already been used in Palestinian nationalist
mythology,31 this image was not directly related to the deprivation of human
rights, but to the loss of the Palestinian homeland – at least before 1982.
Finally, these documents and their narratives are all produced, published,
and diffused either by Palestinian NGOs or by groups which include Palestinian
NGOs as members, such the FCEP. The actual authors of these narratives of the
Palestinian presence in Lebanon outlined in these quotes are key figures in
Palestinian NGOs who are ideologically close to the PLO parties and econom-
ically dependent on foreign donors.32 They also have similar profiles mixing
political engagement with training in research institutions, as in the cases of Jaber
Suleiman and Aziza al-Khalidi.
In conclusion, the Palestinian NGO-created reports (to which these quotes
belong) provide the reader – regardless of being an English-speaking foreigner
involved in development cooperation targeting Palestinians or an Arabic-speak-
ing decision-/opinion-maker – with a representation of the Palestinians as a
homogenous group of refugees who, because of the deprivation of their basic
rights, are forced to live in dreadful living conditions.
3.2. The diffusion of NGO-produced representations and the intellectual
debate on the legal reform
In order to demonstrate that these representations have shaped the intellectual
boundaries of the collective actions and experts’ debates concerning the reform
initiatives, I take an epistemological stance similar to James Ferguson’s concern-
ing World Bank reports on Lesotho.33 Hence, I do not take the documents
mentioned above as exact representations of social reality, but as tools handled
by collective actors in pursuing their perceived interests and their envisaged
political projects. Therefore, I believe it is important to ask when, by whom,
30 Indeed, this comparison can be done only if one assumes the internal homogeneity of Palestinian commu-
nities scattered in the region, as Suleiman’s paper, the Najdeh survey, and the PHRO report do.
31 Cf. J. Peteet, Landscape of Hope and Despair: Palestinian Refugee Camps, Philadelphia, PENN, 2005, 142.
32 This is true not only for the mentioned quotes. The same signifiers may be found in the surveys, reports, and
press releases elaborated by Palestinian NGOs ideologically close to Hamas and the Tah[aluf. As Youssef (a
staff member of one of these NGOs) once stated, their documents aim to make the public aware of the
refugees’ suffering due to Palestinians’ exclusion from the labour market. Interview with Youssef, 30 Jun.
2011, Beirut.
33 Cf. J. Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development” , Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in
Lesotho, Cambridge/New York/Port Chester, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
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how, and to whom these documents – and the representations they convene –
have been actually diffused after their elaboration.
Three types of events favoured the diffusion of these reports in the public
space: public presentations held by the organizations publishing the reports,
specialist gatherings (such as academic conferences and expert roundtables)
concerning access to the labour market for Lebanon’s Palestinians, and the
mobilisations linked to the 2010 campaign advocating the improvement of
Palestinians’ access to the labour market. Each pattern differs from the others
in terms of: (1) specific transmission dynamics of the representation of the
Palestinian presence in Lebanon; (2) different targeted audiences; and (3) varying
objectives of the transmitting actor(s). Interestingly, the transmitted content –
i.e. the positive economic impact of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon – stays
the same.
The first type of diffusion activity consists mainly of public events organized
by the reports’ publishers. The public presentations of the Najdeh report, orga-
nized between the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010, are concrete examples
of these kinds of activities. In these meetings, the Najdeh director and the author
of the study presented the Najdeh report at the local and national level by
engaging mayors, ministers, and Lebanese Members of Parliament (MPs) in
meetings in Beirut, Sidon, and Tyr.34 The meetings were attended by the
Information Minister Tarek Mitri, MPs from Amal, the Future Movement,
the Popular Nasserite Organization, and local administrations’ representatives,
among others. Similarly, the Committee for the Employment of the Palestinians
(CEP) workshop, organized in 2007 in Beirut to present its Mapping Palestinian
Refugee Employment, engaged several UNRWA and foreign embassies’ staff along
with representatives of Lebanese ministries and directors of Palestinian NGOs.35
In his opening statement, the chair of the CEP36 declared: “This recommenda-
tion [to produce and diffuse knowledge] is the result of a realization that though
Palestinian refugees in the workplace are a fact of everyday life, this employment
remains, to a great extent, a grey area which needs assessing.”37
The main aim of these activities was to give visibility to the report (and its
publisher) among donors, decision-makers, and Lebanese political organizations.
The targeted audience consisted of journalists, representatives of the Lebanese
authorities, diplomats, cooperation agency officers, UNRWA staff, and members
of other NGOs. Finally, these activities allowed the reports – and the convened
images – to simply exist in the public space.
34 Association Najdeh, “Presenting the result of Palestinian refugees’ contribution in the Lebanese economy”,
available at: http://association-najdeh.org/results_of_r2w.htm (last visited 28 Feb. 2010). Another meeting
between Najdeh director and Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) representatives took place in April in Beirut,
interview with Najdeh employee, 15 Jul. 2010, Beirut.
35 The list of participants is included in Annex 4 of the report. (FCEP, Mapping Palestinian Refugee Employment
2007, 22.)
36 Namely, retired ambassador Samir al-Khoury.
37 The whole opening statement can be found in Annex 1 of the report. (FCEP, Mapping Palestinian Refugee
Employment 2007, 22.)
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The second type includes public conferences and experts’ workshop, such as
the conference “Employment of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon: Labour
Market Realities within the Political and Legal Framework” at the American
University of Beirut (AUB). In the opening speech of this event, the Issam
Fares Institute38 Director, Rami Khouri, stated that one of the challenges
lying ahead for research on Palestinians and their employment is “to pin
down reality, if there is one”.39 Indeed, this reality also constituted the main
preoccupation of the conference’s second panel – which dealt with Palestinians’
access to the formal labour market. There, two AUB professors debated the
differences between the Palestinian unemployment rates obtained through quan-
titative surveys and qualitative studies. In the discussion, they made reference to
a 2003 FAFO40 survey about the living conditions of Lebanon’s Palestinians, one
of the main sources of the FCEP report mentioned above. Moreover, in the
question and answer session which followed, Aziza Khalidi – the head researcher
with Najdeh and formerly responsible for the FAFO survey in the field –
brought forward the Najdeh report to support her point on the lack of reliable
figures about Palestinian employment.41 Sari Hanafi (an AUB professor actively
engaged in the promotion of Palestinians’ rights) and Imam Khazaal (the
representative of the Labour Ministry at the FCEP) acknowledged the existence
of the Najdeh report and praised it for its quality. During the concluding dis-
cussion of the “Options for Lobbying and Advocacy” roundtable, the Najdeh
director voiced her concerns about the actual diffusion of the research advocating
Palestinian rights and called for more effective pressure on AUB alumni involved
in the political institutional sphere. Similar exchanges occurred at the closed-
door roundtable organized at the Prime Minister’s Office by the head of the
LPDC in July 2010. There, the first two invited speakers were Jaber Suleiman,
the author of the first report quoted above, and Souheil al-Natour, who, along
with Dalal Yassine, co-authored another widely quoted study on the legal con-
straints on Lebanon’s Palestinians in 2007. According to several roundtable
participants, their interventions were supposed to illustrate their studies and
research about the legal restrictions to Palestinians’ access to the labour market
and their effects on the living condition of the Palestinian community. On the
basis of these presentations, roundtable members were supposed to come up with
sound reform proposals.
Generally speaking, the linear narrative transmission from the speakers to
the audience that characterised the presentations of the reports is replaced by a
circularity in which experts contribute to the creation of “hard facts” with the
38 The Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs is an AUB research centre that launched
several research projects focusing on Palestinian camps from 2006 onwards.
39 This quote, as well as the following descriptions, draws upon my observation notes. Fieldwork journal entry,
26 Apr. 2010, Beirut.
40 Fafo-Institute for Applied International Studies is a Norwegian research institution very active in researching
issue related to the Peace Process in the Middle East.
41 Actually, she contested the idea that the number of work permits issued by the Ministry of Labour represents
a sound indicator of the employment rate.
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purpose of guiding the decision-making process carried out by
Lebanese decision-makers. Significantly, in both anecdotes data from differ-
ent reports were confronted and opposed with the aim of providing
individuals in charge of drafting the reform with an adequate basis of
knowledge. Thus, it is not surprising that the targeted receivers are Lebanese
politicians and civil servants in charge of regulating Palestinians’ access
to the labour market. In the end, through this modality, or pattern of diffu-
sion, the mentioned reports acquire the status of shared references that orient
the debate among experts and set the intellectual boundaries of the political
debate.
The third type of diffusion activities includes mass-mobilising events related
to the reform of the legal regime regulating Palestinians’ access to the labour
market. The most important among them, at least in terms of mobilised par-
ticipants,42 has been the march for the civil and economic rights of the
Palestinians on 27 June 2010 in Beirut. The preparation of this event started
in February of that year, when an organizing committee – formed by represen-
tatives of most Palestinian NGOs43 and non-affiliated activists – was created to
set up an advocacy campaign that culminated in a rally. The initiative was
intended by some members of the organizing committee to be supported by a
representation that counters the existing one, named hereafter the Lebanese
mainstream representation.44 As Ghassam stated, this is necessary to have an
impact on Lebanese authorities’ attitude:
[. . .] Because they [the Lebanese] said we have a bad effect on the economy.
Ok. Let’s see if we have a bad or a good effect on the economy. Because here
they don’t understand if you talk only about the rights. We should talk
about the [. . .] al-musa}ada (trans.: the contribution), you know. They
should feel that Palestinians support the economy, that this is good for
the Lebanese economy, you know, bisa}ada al-dawr al-|iqtis [adya (trans: it
helps the economic cycle).45
42 On 27 June, thousands of individuals marched from the Sports’ city to the city center and presented a
petition for the improvement of Palestinian rights to the Lebanese Parliament.
43 Among others, Najdeh and PHRO. Several NGOs withdrew their support for the committee and the march
itself. The most evident absence was one of the Palestinian NGOs ideologically close to Hamas. They
withdrew from the committee a few weeks before the march and organized a sit-in on their own on 26 June.
44 Whereas it is true that the Lebanese have varying perceptions of the Palestinian presence, one cannot deny
that in the institutional political sphere one specific narrative is shared by all sides – with the exemption of
Jumblatt’s PSP. In a nutshell, in the mainstream representation the threat of naturalization (tawbyn) is used as
a scarecrow to prevent any improvement of the legal status of the Palestinians. J. Chaaban et al., Socio-
Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, Beirut, AUB-UNRWA, 2010. A more in-depth discus-
sion about this narrative is included in the next session, but for more developed accounts, see D. Meier,
Mariages et identite´ nationale au Liban : les relations libano-palestiniennes dans le Liban de Tae¨f (1989-2005),
Gene`ve/Paris, Institut de hautes e´tudes internationales et du de´veloppement; Karthala, 2008; R. Bocco & J.
Al-Husseini, “The Status of the Palestinian Refugees in the Near East: the Right of Return and UNRWA in
Perspective”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 28(2–3), 2010, 264–265.
45 Interview with Ghassam, 8 Jun. 2011, Beirut. Ghassam is a fictitious name that I gave to this informant to
protect their anonymity.
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Ghassam’s claim that the new narrative has to be based on concrete facts – such
as economic arguments – rather than on an exclusively rights-based approach
resonates with the position held by ‘Ali. He explained how the organization of
the rally started:
Often you need to create a certain narrative to support you. One, one of the
things we don’t have [is] a clear obvious narrative everyone agrees on. So,
there is . . . we did so big meetings [sic] with all the people that work on the
issue like Souheil al-Natour, like Jaber Suleiman and we started to see what
kind [. . .] you have to offer an alternative if you want to do a legislation
[. . .] So these people did so many researches [sic] and we tried to create two
narratives: one for the legislator and one for the people, Lebanese and
Palestinians. [sic]46
In the same conversation, ‘Ali outlined the sources of the data used by the
organizing committee to build the new narrative, which included the Najdeh
and PHRO reports as well as the documents published by the CEP and the
International Labour Organization’s (ILO) local office.47 Through the organiz-
ing committee’s campaign, the narrative included in the reports – which portrays
Palestinians in Lebanon as refugees who are forced into dire living conditions
because of the deprivation of their basic rights – was translated into the discur-
sive practices (such as the slogans, flyers, etc.) used during the rally and the other
advocacy-related events.48
For instance, the main slogan of the rally, repeated during the demonstra-
tion by all participants and written centrally in the flyers calling for people’s
participation, said “Bidna na}aysh bi-l-karama li-n}awd”.49 The two main
themes/topics of the new narrative (i.e., Return/ }awda and Dignity/karama)
appeared clearly in the elaboration phase of the slogan. Indeed, during the
committee meeting in which the slogan was formulated, two proposals were
put forward: bidna na}aysh li-n}awd50 and bidna na}aysh bi-l-karama.51
Refusing to forgo either one or the other, committee members agreed to melt
the two proposed refrains into one.52
While the translation of the main elements of the NGO-produced narrative
into the keywords Return/}awda and Dignity/karama created a bridge with the
signifiers used in the height of the Palestinian nationalism in Lebanon,
46 Interview with ‘Ali, 8 Jul. 2011, Beirut. ‘Ali is a fictitious name that I gave to this informant to protect their
anonymity.
47 Interview with ‘Ali, 8 Jul. 2011, Beirut.
48 The committee produced press releases, called for press conferences, organized expert workshops, etc. These
events belong to the previous two patterns of diffusion and are not considered in this portion of the text.
49 “We want to live in dignity so that we will return” in English. Observation notes, 27 Jun. 2010, Beirut.
50 Translated in English to: I want to live to return.
51 Translated in English to: I want to live in dignity.
52 This reconstruction is based on the fragments collected in several interviews with committee members.
Interview with ‘Ali, 8 Jul. 2011, Beirut; Interview with Ghassam, 8 Jun. 2011, Beirut; Interview with
Fatmi, 13 Jul. 2011, Beirut.
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a significant symbolic variation occurred. In the nationalist mythology produced
by the PLO, karama referred to the first Arab victory ever obtained by Arab
fighters against Israeli armed forces in the Jordanian village of Karama and to the
general idea of armed struggle. In the slogan elaborated by the organizers of the
march, the word “dignity” recalls the living conditions and the economic situ-
ation of Lebanon’s Palestinians relating them to the minimum human rights
standards.53 Actually, this is the most innovative element of the NGO-produced
narrative in comparison to those previously elaborated by the PLO and
Palestinian political parties.
Finally, this type of diffusion activity differed greatly from the ones
described above because its aim was not only to convene a message or engage
in a discussion, but also to overtly oppose the Lebanese mainstream narrative and
put pressure on Lebanese institutions.54 In this sense, it had an explicitly con-
tentious character, rather than a purely communicative purpose. In terms of the
targeted audience, the richness and depth of statistical data supporting the
NGO-produced narratives included in the written reports got lost in a single-
sentence slogan. This adaptation of NGO-produced narratives, however, allowed
for the expansion of the targeted audience, including the mobilised Palestinians
and Lebanese who took part in the June rallies. Additionally, the symbolic ref-
erences mobilised during the demonstrations were further diffused thanks to
articles published in the most important national newspapers, such as al-safyr,
al-|akhbar, al-liwa|, and mustaqbal. Finally, thanks to the connection of the
organizers with an Ayn el-Hilwe hip-hop crew, the slogan of the 27 June
2010 march became the title of a downloadable rap song.55
In conclusion, the NGO-produced, converging narratives of the Palestinian
presence in Lebanon constitute the main sources shaping the discussion at two
levels. They set the boundaries of discussion at the level of the policy-orienting/
oriented debate among experts and specialists as well as at the level of the
mobilisation practices engaging both Palestinian and Lebanese individuals and
Lebanese political actors – such as the parties, the Parliament, and the
Government. The potential outreach of the latter practices extends much further
than the outreach of the former ones – which only concerned diplomats,
politicians, civil servants, and cooperation workers. By widely diffusing the
NGO-produced narratives among the refugee population residing in Lebanon,
Palestinian NGO activists created a complex narrative based on symbolic
references to displacement (i.e. refugee-ness) and emplacement (i.e. the dire
53 For an analysis of the use of the idea of “Dignity” in the Tunisian revolution, see M. Be´chir Ayari, “Des
maux de la mise`re aux mots de la ‘dignite´’. La re´volution tunisienne de janvier 2011”, Revue Tiers Monde
2011/5, (Hors se´rie), 2011, 209–18.
54 ‘Ali, a member of an NGO who took part in the organization of the rally, used the following words to state
the goals of the demonstration: “our goal was to have legislation; this legislation has to go to the Parliament.
This was one of the specific goals.” Interview with ‘Ali, 8 Jul. 2011, Beirut.
55 Interview with ‘Ali, 8 Jul. 2011, Beirut. Even though I looked for this song myself, I have not been able to find
it. About the political relevance of rap music among Palestinians in Lebanon, see N. Puig, “ ‘Bienvenue dans les
camps!’, L’e´mergence d’un rap palestinien au Liban: une nouvelle chanson sociale et politique”, in F. Mermier &
N. Puig (eds.), Itine´raires esthe´tiques et sce`nes culturelles au Proche-Orient, Beyrouth, IFPO, 2007.
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living conditions in Lebanon) of Palestinian refugees in the media and in the
intra-Lebanese political debate. From this perspective, its symbolic span – aimed
at supporting the reform of the legal framework regulating Palestinians’ access to
the labour market – was not limited to the economic integration issue, but
envisaged a wider vision of the collective existence of the Palestinians in
Lebanon struggling with the vision developed by Lebanese political actors to
frame the refugees’ presence. In this sense, it is possible to speak of the
Palestinian NGOs’ narrative in terms of what Brubaker called a “diasporic
project”,56 whose “diasporic” nature is presented in the next section.
4. “Dignity” and “Return” as constitutive elements of
NGOs-produced diasporic project
As previously mentioned, Palestinian NGO activists formulated a certain narra-
tive about the Palestinian presence in Lebanon to support their demands for legal
change and to influence Lebanese decision-making. The symbolic span of the
narrative went beyond these demands; it also incorporated a project of collective
existence based on a specific process of imagination of the emplacement in
Lebanon and of the displacement from Palestine. In this section, I construct
an inductive argument in favour of the recognition of the diasporic character of
this imagination consistent with Clifford’s relational definition of diasporas.57
The use of the concept of diaspora is not new in the academic literature on
the social and political organization of the Palestinians living outside historic
Palestine. Drawing on the early-1990s theoretical debate about this concept,58 a
number of researchers became engaged in a discussion on the essence of
Palestinian displacement outside the Occupied Territories.59 Sari Hanafi,
Helena Lindholm-Schultz, and Juliane Hammer assert that considering
Palestinian communities outside the Occupied Territories through diaspora
lenses helps in understanding the political relations – in terms of representation
structures as well as of identity construction – between these communities and
the host societies without jeopardising the administrative, legal, and moral
dimensions linked to refugee status (and to the Palestinians’ loss of their
56 R. Brubaker. The ‘diaspora’ diaspora, 13.
57 J. Clifford, “Diasporas”, Cultural Anthropology, 9(3), 1994.
58 For an overview of this debate, see W. Safran, “Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and
Return”, Diaspora, 1(1), 1991; J. Clifford. Diasporas; L. Malkki. Refugees and Exile: From “Refugee Studies” to
the National Order of Things. For an assessment of the diffusion of the notion of diaspora, see R. Brubaker.
The ‘diaspora’ diaspora.
59 For the most recent works expanding on this debate, see B. Kodmani Darwish, La diaspora palestinienne,
Paris, Puf, 1997; S. Hanafi, “Rethinking the Palestinians Abroad as a Diaspora: The Relationships between
the Diaspora and the Palestinian Territories”, International Social Science Review, 4(1–2), 2003, 157–82;
H. Lindholm-Schulz & J. Hammer (eds.), The Palestinian Diaspora. Formation of Identities and Politics of the
Homeland, London/New York, Routledge, 2003; J. Peteet, “Problematizing a Palestinian Diaspora”,
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 39(4), 2007, 627–46; S. Hanafi, “Re´fugie´s palestiniens, citoyen-
nete´ et Etat. Vers un nouveau mode`le de l’Etat-Nation”, in L. Camre´zy et al. (eds.), L’asile au sud, Paris, La
Dispute, 2008, 47–66; A. Signoles & J. Al-Husseini, “Construction nationale, territorialite´ et diasporisation:
le cas palestinien”, Maghreb-Machrek, (199), 2009/1, 23–42.
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homeland). On the contrary, Bassma Kodami-Darwish and Julie Peteet cast some
doubts about the adequacy of this concept to describe the pattern of Palestinian
displacement for two reasons. First, the demographic, spatial, and temporal
characteristics of the displacement of Palestinians do not fit with the constitutive
dimensions of diasporas isolated in the theoretical literature.60 Second, these
authors contend that the labelling of Palestinians as a diaspora has a profound
political impact.61 More precisely, it is contended that the fluidity and inclusivity
of the notion of diaspora, as elaborated by post-national and transnationalism
theorists, may help conceal the exilic dimension of Palestinians’ displace-
ment;62 a dimension – signified by the right of return (h[aq al-}awda) to
Palestine – that occupies a central place in the imagination of Palestinian
national consciousness.63
The use of the diaspora concept in all of these works is highly problematic
because of the teleological character willingly or unwillingly attached to this
concept. Both diaspora supporters and diaspora opponents assume that this
concept entails a certain integration of the displaced community into the host
one. Starting from this assumption, these authors either contest the political
ramifications of integration or try to understate them. Drawing on Lisa
Malkki’s seminal work about displacement, I propose to address the issue
differently. More specifically, I propose setting aside the political ramifications
of the use of the term “diaspora” in the Palestinian case64 and to look at
diaspora/diasporic projects as political means and not as political ends. By
doing so, I concur with those scholars who “see the study of the everyday
facts of diaspora, movement, and displacement as lens through which to examine
the supposedly normal condition of being attached to a territorialized polity and
an identifiable people”.65
4.1. “Dignity” and “Return” as signifiers of the spatialised imagination of
the Palestinian diasporic project
The NGO-produced narrative introduced in the previous section hinges on two
signifiers: dignity and the dyad refugee-ness/return. But, to what do they refer?
To which practices and perceptions? Concerning dignity, it seems clear that the
demand for a change of the legal framework regulating Palestinians’ access to the
labour market aims at the enhancement of Palestinians’ economic integration in
60 J. Peteet. Problematizing Palestinian Diaspora, 632–634.
61 As openly admitted by Julie Peteet, the main issue at stake is constituted by the ‘. . . the political ramifications
of assuming a Palestinian diaspora . . .’. Ibid., 628.
62 Ibid., 629.
63 For a synthetic description of the connection between return and identity, see A. Shiblak, The Palestinian
Refugee Issue: a Palestinian Perspective, London, Chatham House, 12, 2009, available at: http://www.
voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Palestinian_Refugee_Issue.pdf (last visited 12 Oct. 2012).
64 Which is, by the way, very much intertwined with partisan preoccupations about the directions taken by
Palestinian state-building.
65 L. Malkki, Refugees and Exile: From “Refugee Studies” to the National Order of Things, Annual Review of
Anthropology, 24, 1995, 516.
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Lebanon and, subsequently, the improvement of Palestinians’ living conditions.
The narrative diffused via the written reports and the slogans in the June rally
drew on the symbolic reference to dignity to advance the integration of the
Palestinian workers in Lebanese economic life. In order to enable this change,
however, it proved necessary to invoke at the same time the notions of refugee-
ness/return. Without the latter, any modification of the existing legal measures
would hardly have been possible because – as already hinted above – of its
incompatibility with the mainstream Lebanese narrative about the Palestinian
presence in Lebanon embodied in the existing legal measures.
The latter narrative is based on two keystones: the first one is that Lebanon’s
Palestinians are a security problem and should be dealt with as such;66 the second
is that any improvement of Palestinians’ living conditions facilitates assimilation
and their permanent resettlement in Lebanon. As Chaaban et al. lucidly pointed
out:
Tawteen is the scarecrow that has been used within sections of Lebanese
society to generate public phobia against according civil rights to
Palestinians. Indeed through editorials in key Lebanese newspapers [. . .],
Lebanese political groups accuse each other of promoting tawbyn, an act
tantamount to treason [. . .] Others (including religious authorities) con-
sider the mere talk of the Palestinians’ right to work as being the first step
towards tawbyn.67
Both of these arguments were called upon to justify the preservation of the
existing legal regime regarding Palestinians’ access to the labour market.
Between June and August 2010, they often recurred in the political debate
about the reform of this regime, which engaged Lebanese political parties sitting
in Parliament. In concrete terms, Christian parties’ MPs repeatedly declared to
the press that only humanitarian and social rights – rather than civil rights
leading to the naturalization of refugees – should be granted to the
Palestinians.68 The dispute over the kind of rights to be granted was coupled
with the call for the disarmament of Palestinian armed forces inside refugee
camps thus showing how intrinsically entangled the Lebanese narrative and
the opposition to the reform of the existing legal regime are. When asked
about his position concerning the reform, then Labour Minister Boutrous
Harb declared: “It’s necessary to strengthen the principle that rights go hand
in hand with responsibilities when it comes to the Palestinian refugees’ relation
with the Lebanese state.”69
66 Cf. J. Suleiman, “The Current Political, Organizational, and Security Situation in the Palestinian Refugee
Camps of Lebanon”, Journal of Palestine Studies, 29(1), 1999, 71–72.
67 J. Chaaban et al., Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon.
68 E. Sakr , “Parliament Discusses Granting Basic Rights to Palestinians”, The Daily Star, 24 Jun. 2010, sec.
Politics.
69 Quote published on E. Sakr, “Harb: No ‘civil rights’ for Palestinian refugees”, The Daily Star, 26 Jun. 2010,
sec. Politics.
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It is against these arguments – i.e., the mentioning of Palestinian involve-
ment in the civil war and the (dishonorable) loss of the Palestinian homeland to
justify the exclusion of the Palestinians from the Lebanese host society – that ‘Ali,
Ghassam, and other activists stood up and elaborated their own narrative of the
Palestinian community as an economically integrated national minority striving
to return to their homeland. In documenting the Palestinians’ lack of dignity70
in spite of their contribution to the Lebanese economy through informal labour
with statistics, tables, and graphs, Palestinian NGO activists highlighted the
advantages of economic integration for both Lebanese and Palestinian commu-
nities and legitimised the emplacement of the latter in the economic life of the
former. At the same time, the boundary between the two communities was
maintained by constantly referring to the Palestinian displacement and right
of return.
On the one hand, stressing the fundamental importance of the right of
return defused the allegations of facilitating naturalisation formulated by those
Lebanese who opposed any reform of the existing legal regime. On the other
hand, the claim that the NGOs’ narrative put forward the right of return and
called for humanitarian and basic rights just to avoid these allegations71 is not
consistent with the perceptions of NGO activists. According to my informants,
the mention of return has implications going far beyond the debate taking place
inside Lebanon. More specifically, the right of return (as well as the other
symbolic references to Palestinian displacement) is not just a rhetorical tool
used to end legal discrimination, but a symbolic reference to the actual capability
to choose between going back to the Palestinian homeland or not.72 Therefore,
this connection with the homeland not only serves to demarcate the boundary
between the Lebanese and the Palestinians, but it also perpetuates the unifying
connection among all Palestinians. In a certain way, the distinctiveness entailed
by referring to the right of return contributed to both differentiating the
Palestinians from the Lebanese host society and increasing the internal cohesion
of the Palestinian (imagined) national affiliation.
In rejecting the dichotomy of naturalization vs. return and putting forward
symbolic references to dignity, the NGO-produced representation carved out the
main signifiers of a political project aimed at the establishment of a community
in-between; a community which strives for an enhanced emplacement in the host
society and simultaneously cultivates the myth of the end of its displacement
from its own homeland.73 As a matter of fact, although Palestinian NGO
activists did not openly invoke the notion of diaspora to further their political
70 As Youssef, an activist engaged in producing reports, once said: “we don’t want to be weak in our action. We
want to have sound figures to diffuse to others organizations and institutions.” Interview with Youssef,
30 Jun. 2011, Beirut.
71 As claimed in J. Chaaban et al., Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon.
72 Interview with ‘Ali, 8 Jul. 2011, Beirut.
73 About the mythical dimensions of diasporic projects, see W. Safran. Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of
Homeland and Return.
Refugee Survey Quarterly 19
 at Y
ale U






projects and to oppose the actual legal framework imposed by Lebanese autho-
rities,74 they put forward the notions of refugee-ness, return, and dignity in their
attempt to contrast the Lebanese imaginative hegemony anchored in the refusal
of refugees’ naturalisation on the basis of their perceived threat to security.
In doing so, Palestinian NGO activists called simultaneously for assimilation
and distinction; they brought about a specific representation of the Palestinian
presence in Lebanon hinging on signifiers of – economic – integration
(i.e. dignity) and of distinct national belonging (i.e. refugee-ness/return dyad).
So, this twofold representation is consistent with Clifford’s relational conceptu-
alization of “diaspora”, i.e. a “signifier of political struggles to define the local, as
distinctive community, in historical contexts of displacement”.75 Otherwise said,
the NGO-produced representation of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon has a
diasporic character because – in demanding a modification of the legal frame-
work constraining everyday economic integration of the national group formed
by the Palestinian refugees – it imagines a distinct Palestinian community
displaced on Lebanese territory.
5. Conclusion
From this perspective, the imagination of Lebanon’s Palestinian presence – and
the project incorporated in it – presents one feature equally observed in other
imaginative processes of communities that claimed and attained the label of
diasporas. This feature is the distinctive tension that opposes Palestinian political
and cultural entrepreneurs to the Lebanese ones in the struggle over Palestinian
segregation. According to the intentions of Palestinian NGO activists, their
political project maintains a distinct Palestinian communal affiliation vis-a`-vis
the Lebanese one. In this case, however, the struggle is not against assimilationist
tendencies coming from the host society. To the contrary, the NGO-produced
narrative preserves the sense of belonging to a Palestinian nation through
connection to the homeland (implicit in the mention of the right of return)
against two exclusivist nationalist hegemonies: on the one hand, the ideology
underpinning exclusionary legal and administrative practices carried on by
Lebanese authorities; and, on the other, the imaginative processes justifying
the Israeli colonial endeavour. In a nutshell, the distinctive tension is
designed not to resist assimilation of Palestinians in the host society, but to
facilitate it – contrary to what happens in other diasporic projects.76 In the
case of NGO-produced representations of the Palestinian presence in
Lebanon, the valorisation of an exclusive national consciousness of the diasporic
74 Contrary to what James Clifford observed in his article about diasporas (cf. J. Clifford. Diasporas, 310.)
75 Ibid., 308.
76 In the empirical studies used in theoretical debates about diasporas, groups of political entrepreneurs of the
diasporic minority resist State assimilatory policies through the valorisation of solidarity networks and
imagined identities with the homeland (cf. ibid.; R. Brubaker. The ‘diaspora’ diaspora).
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community is used to enhance its (economic) assimilation against the resilience
of a host society’s state institutions.
In response to the initial questions concerning the imagination of the
Palestinian presence in Lebanon, the empirical study presented in this article
exposes two peculiarities of the diasporic project elaborated by Palestinian
political entrepreneurs in Lebanon. First, it not only engages the Lebanese
host authorities, the Palestinian displaced community, and the Palestinian home-
land; it also involves Israel’s colonial policies. Consequently, it entails conten-
tious interactions that cannot be grasped using conceptualisations of diaspora
that focus on the relations between homeland, host country, and the diasporic
community. In this sense, the empirical study supports Kodami-Darwish’s and
Peteet’s criticisms of the use of the diaspora notion in the Palestinian case.
Second, the diasporic projects formulated by Palestinian NGOs’ activists exploit
the attachment to homeland to partially contrast the segregation carried out by
the political authorities that rule over the host societies. Hence, the main object
of contention, at least in Lebanon, is the integration of the local Palestinian
community rather than the enhancement of its internal cohesion and its
connections with Palestinians living elsewhere in the world. This conclusion
supports Lindholm-Schultz and Hammer’s and Hanafi’s use of the notion of
diaspora in the Palestinian case.
These peculiar traits suggest that, at least in Lebanon’s case, Julie Peteet’s
warning about the dangers of assuming a Palestinian diaspora blending into the
host society may be valid. I wonder, however, how beneficial it would be to
discard the notion of diaspora as a politically-laden concept for understanding
the social and political dynamics inside and among Palestinian communities
living outside the Occupied Territories. As the second peculiarity identified in
the empirical study seems to suggest, looking to spatialising imaginations of the
Palestinian collective existence as diasporic projects elaborated outside the pol-
itical “centre” of the Palestinian nation is helpful to partially frame the power
relations that occur between the Palestinian communities settled outside the
West Bank and Gaza and their host countries. Furthermore, this stance may
prove to be helpful in assessing the empirical utility of the diaspora concept in
the Palestinian case rather than the other way around.
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